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During the post-war years many European countries have implemented far-reaching but
diverse pension systems with the objective of providing those in retirement with adequate
incomes. In this study, we explore the link between pension systems and the adequacy of
retirement income. We analyse the mix of public and private pensions and consider the
impact of different policies on poverty rates amongst pensioners. We suggest that only a
few European countries have been successful in providing combinations of private and
public pensions that improve the adequacy of retirement income.
Keywords: Pension income, private pensions, public pensions, pension systems.
I n t roduct ion
The implementation of different pension systems across Europe reﬂects the importance
of distinct objectives within each government. We focus on the current pension beneﬁts
that are mainly the results of policies implemented in the post-war years. Comprehensive
pension systems were set up in the post-war years and led to two broad classiﬁcations
of welfare traditions, the Bismarckian and the Beveridgean models. In countries of
Bismarckian tradition, state pensions are part of social insurance tradition and constitute
high proportions of welfare expenditure. Other countries have opted for variants of the
Beveridge model, where only a minimum income is guaranteed in the form of state
pension, and private contributions to funded schemes are encouraged (Baldwin, 1990;
Kolmar, 2007). We measure the beneﬁts of current pensioners to assess whether there is a
link between pension systems belonging to different welfare models and levels of pension
incomes.
In recent years, extensive literature has contributed to the debate on the classiﬁcation
of different European countries into distinct types of welfare regimes (see for example
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Korpi and Palme, 1998; and
more recently Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003; Jensen, 2008; Arcanjo, 2011). Country
classiﬁcation can raise challenging issues, particularly as policy changes have occurred
frequently in recent decades rendering increasingly complex the theoretical or ideal
contrast between welfare systems and often weakening their distinctive features (Werding,
2003). We use country classiﬁcation in relation to welfare systems prior to the reforms
of the last 20 years to explore the extent of the connection between pensions systems
and current levels of pension incomes. This has been done by Korpi and Palme (1998)
to explain differences in income inequality levels, and by Johnson (1999) to explore the
convergence of social security systems.
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We explore three main issues: ﬁrstly, we estimate the importance of public and private
pensions within EU countries; secondly, we investigate the existence of a crowding out
effect between private and public pensions; thirdly, we study the link between adequacy
of pension income and pension systems. Evidence of a crowding out effect between public
and private pensions entails that retirees enjoy similar levels of income post-retirement
across countries, independently of the type and generosity of pension systems. In devising
our research questions, we follow Pedersen’s (2004) framework and deﬁnitions of public
and private sources of retirement income. A public pension is a state-provided beneﬁt
that covers all those in employment, while a private pension implies that coverage and
beneﬁts of the scheme ensue from the decisions taken by individuals and it includes
private insurance pensions as well as occupational/employers’ pension schemes.
The deﬁnition above is not unproblematic. It implies that where membership to
occupational pension schemes is mandatory rather than resulting from the employees’
decisions to join the scheme, these ought to be included in the public sphere. We choose
to conﬁne occupational schemes to the private domain even when mandated, if their
funding derives from private sources rather than from the state (occupational schemes
in the Netherlands are a good example). Nevertheless, we also note that the mandatory
feature of occupational schemes has important repercussions on the level of coverage of
private pensions and may entail that private beneﬁts are used to complement basic state
pensions rather than to substitute them.
The countries included in our sample are all part of the European Union but
belong to different traditions with regard to pension provision, saving and retirement
policies. The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. We use data from the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)1 and from the English Longitudinal Study of
Ageing (ELSA). The data used were collated in 2004 and published in 2005.
This article is structured in four sections. The next section reviews the pension
arrangements in the countries examined and the relevant theoretical issues on the roles
of public and private pensions. In the third section, we present our analysis and ﬁndings
on the issue of adequacy of retirement income. In the ﬁnal section, we conclude.
Pens ion ar rangements in Europe
The public pension system is one of the major components of the welfare state in Europe.
However, the extent to which public pensions are seen as a means of social and economic
equality varies remarkably from country to country and current pension beneﬁts are
mainly the legacy of decisions and arrangements made by political forces in power in
the post-war years. The different pension systems implemented led to two main forms of
welfare traditions, the Bismarckian and the Beveridgean models.
The Bismarckian policy tradition, initially adopted in Germany in the late nineteenth
century, was later embraced by many other countries (such as Austria, France, Italy, Spain,
Greece) in central and southern Europe (Baldwin, 1990; Ferrera, 1996; Boersch-Supan,
2006), where public pensions are considered a form of social insurance (Hennessy, 2008).
In these countries, the state PAYG pensions are predominant and can take the form of
social assistance. The Beveridgean tradition focuses on the provision of a universal welfare
coverage, with a basic pension, varying according to the number of years in employment.
The state pension takes the role of a redistributive component designed to prevent poverty
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in old age (Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006). According to Bonoli’s (1997) classiﬁcation
of social policy tradition, the Anglo-Scandinavian welfare system reﬂects the Beveridge
model, whilst the Continental European welfare system developed into the Bismarckian
model.
Public pension beneﬁts in Bismarckian countries are provided according to
contributions, they are earnings-related and with the objective of income maintenance
after retirement. The Beveridgean social tradition is based on the provision of universal,
mostly ﬂat-rate beneﬁts (although means-testing is frequently used) with the objective of
preventing poverty. In this system, pension income comes from several sources. The main
differences between the two models consist in the mix of public and private beneﬁts
provided and in the way pension schemes are ﬁnanced. According to Bonoli (2003), in
Bismarckian countries the extensiveness and generosity of earnings-related state beneﬁts
might have hindered the role and expansion of occupational/private pensions. The debate
on the unfunded nature of PAYG public schemes is centred on how these schemes expose
the traditionally generous social insurance countries to the economic and social threats
posed by ageing populations (OECD, 1998). This is also why recently many countries
have made adjustments to render pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems sustainable
and others have encouraged pension systems privatisation with a greater emphasis on
individual savings (Pedersen, 2004).
Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Spain and Greece are closer to the Bismarckian
model, where public pensions make up the majority of retirement income, include
disability and survivor beneﬁts (Haverland, 2001) and present higher pension expenditures
as a proportion of GDP. The classiﬁcation of Sweden presents some problems; Korpi
and Palme (1998) deﬁne Sweden as an encompassing model due to the mixed
nature of its welfare state where a ﬂat-rate basic pension is paid together with a
supplementary, income-related pension (ATP) calculated according to deﬁned beneﬁt
principles (Anderson, 2001). However, Bonoli (2003) classiﬁes Sweden as a social
insurance country (closer to the Bismarckian model) due to its pension system being
predominantly ﬁnanced on a PAYG basis. Our analysis indicates that Sweden does
present mixed features, such as a widespread coverage of private pensions but also
an earnings-related unfunded state pension; hence for the purpose of this article we use
Korpi and Palme’s classiﬁcation of Sweden as an encompassing model. As suggested
by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Ferrera and Hemerijck (2003), we classify Belgium as a
conservative-corporatist welfare regime (like Germany, France, Austria and Italy) close to
the Bismarckian social insurance tradition.
An important feature of the Beveridgean model is that individuals bear the
responsibility of maintaining their living standards (Beveridge, 1942) through membership
to occupational/private pension schemes and pension planning (Rowlingson, 2002). In
these countries (UK, Denmark and theNetherlands), funded private occupational schemes
have thrived and sometimes taken mandatory form (for example in the Netherlands). This
welfare system often includes additional means-tested beneﬁts targeted to pensioners
whose contributions are not sufﬁcient to provide them with a pension income above the
national poverty threshold.
Within Beveridgean countries there are notable differences pertaining to the type and
level of state pension as well as to the extensiveness of occupational/private schemes.
The UK and Denmark present a ﬁrst-tier state pension that includes basic beneﬁts (the
same amount is paid to all retirees according to the number of years in employment)
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and targeted plans or means-tested beneﬁts (Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006). In the
early 1960s, the UK introduced a state second pension, closely related to the level of
earnings. From the late 1970s, this was called the State Earnings Related Pension scheme
(SERPs), and in 2002 was replaced by the State Second Pension (S2P) (Blake, 2003). The
Netherlands pay a basic state ﬂat-rate pension (AOW) to all residents from the age of 65
(50 years of residency are required for full beneﬁts). The level of the full state beneﬁt here
is set at 70 per cent of the net minimum wage for singles and 100 per cent for couples
(Haverland, 2001).
The privately managed schemes are predominantly deﬁned beneﬁt in the
Netherlands, deﬁned contribution in Denmark and a mix of deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned
contribution in the UK. In deﬁned beneﬁt plans, pension beneﬁts are paid according to
the number of years of contribution and as a proportion of annual earnings from work.
In deﬁned contribution schemes, individuals receive a pension from the monies invested
and the return from the invested assets (Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006); this however,
is susceptible to inﬂation and price volatility in the capital markets (Haverland, 2001).
The ro le o f pub l i c and pr i va te pens ions
In this article, we address the issue of poverty rates and inequality amongst countries with
different pension systems (other studies on this topic have been produced by Baldwin,
1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Banks et al., 2002; Immergut et al., 2007). Some literature
suggests that in countries with low, ﬂat-rate public pensions, private pensions thrive,
while where public beneﬁts are earnings-related, private/occupational pensions tend to
be under-developed (Bonoli, 2003). According to Immergut et al. (2007), in countries
where public pensions are far-reaching, they tend to crowd out private beneﬁts, such
as employers’ schemes and private pension insurance, whereas private schemes are
likely to replace public beneﬁts if the provision of state pensions is low. This however,
in countries where private pensions have become an important source of income, has
sparked concerns over retirement savings and levels of pensions for those on very low
incomes, who typically rely on state beneﬁts (Taylor-Gooby, 2005).
The concept of a crowding out effect between the private sphere and public retirement
beneﬁts provided through the welfare system was discussed extensively by Feldstein
in 1974 and studied by a number of other authors (see for example Browning and
Lusardi, 1996; Disney, 2000; Pedersen, 2004; Ku¨nemund and Rein, 1999). Evidence
of a substitution/crowding out effect between private and public pensions is in agreement
with the life-cycle motive for saving, that is to provide for anticipated imbalances between
future income and consumption standards (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Pedersen,
2004). According to the life-cycle theory, individuals’ saving for retirement reduces at
the presence of a generous public pension (Feldstein, 1974). Disney (2000) ﬁnds some
evidence of crowding out effects between pension wealth and private saving when he
investigates the consequences of the 1992 Italian pension reform. The effects of welfare
policies and different levels of social security on saving rates were studied by Atkinson
(1991), Hubbard et al. (1995), and Feldstein (2005) amongst others. Hubbard et al. (1995)
as well as Feldstein (1974: 1996) document the decline in personal saving, particularly
in low-income households, caused by social insurance programs.
However, research on the existence of a crowding out effect has resulted in
contradictory conclusions. Pedersen (2004) examines the relationship between public
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and private pensions across a number of OECD countries and ﬁnds that there is no clear
or consistent evidence of a crowding out effect. Dobbin and Boychuck (1996) as well as
Ku¨nemund and Rein (1999) show how more generous welfare systems might stimulate,
rather than hamper, private resources. This means, for example, that private pensions
could be boosted by higher public pensions because of greater expectations of what is
considered to be adequate post-retirement income (Pedersen, 2004).
In the following section, we examine the empirical evidence on the extent of the
coverage and the levels of private and public retirement beneﬁts.
Pub l i c and pr i va te beneﬁts
This analysis focuses on the coverage and levels of public and private pensions in Europe to
shed light on a number of issues. We examine whether there is any signiﬁcant difference
between Bismarckian and Beveridgean countries in terms of private, public and total
pension incomes. We show whether private and public beneﬁts are received jointly to
improve overall retirement incomes or whether there is evidence of a crowding out effect.
We deﬁne individuals as retired if they deﬁne themselves as retired or if they have received
a public pension in the preceding 12 months combined with retirement from economic
activity (Gough and Arkani, 2007). This in some cases includes early retirees receiving
only occupational pensions. The choice to consider self-selection was made in order to
adopt a homogenous deﬁnition of retirement across countries where effective retirement
ages do vary greatly. Those who did not deﬁne themselves as ‘retired’ but did receive a
public pension were also included in our sample.
SHARE and ELSA distinguish between public and private pension sources. Public
pensions include old age public pension, public pension and early retirement, public
injury insurance, public pension of reversibility, public pension of invalidity and war
public pension. Private pensions include private or employer’s pension and early or pre-
retirement insurance for disability, pension of reversibility. SHARE allows us to carry
out the income analysis at the individual level, in line with Pedersen’s, consistently
across countries, whichwould otherwise be rendered difﬁcult by countries’ idiosyncrasies.
SHARE is a multidisciplinary cross-national longitudinal survey of continental Europeans
over the age of 50. The baseline study includes data on 12 countries (ten EU countries
at the time of the analysis) providing a representation of the different European regions
from Scandinavia through Central Europe to the Mediterranean. We use data from Wave
1, which include over 31,000 individuals aged 50+ across 11 countries, from which we
excluded Switzerland as it is not part of the European Union. ELSA is a UK database that
covers private households and includes individuals aged 50+. We use data from Wave
2, which include 9,433 individuals interviewed on a range of topics, such as health,
work and retirement, social activity, social-economic position. We employ SHARE Wave
1 and ELSA Wave 2 because they are compatible and they have both been part of a
harmonisation project by the Economic and Social Data Service. Data for both databases
were collected in 2004–05.
The deﬁnition of public and private pensions is not straightforward, particularly when
examining different countries simultaneously. Ambiguity may arise where occupational
pension schemes have been made mandatory by the state, in this case it can be difﬁcult
to effectively distinguish between the public and private sphere if we consider private
pensions as the result of an individual’s free choice. In the countries examined, we
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decided to treat these schemes as private (see Pedersen, 2004) as they are primarily
ﬁnanced by private employers or part of selective welfare arrangements (see for example
France). In the following part of this section, we discuss public and private beneﬁts for
those countries where deﬁnitions are not straightforward.
In France, the distinction between basic and complementary pensions is considered
far more relevant than the difference between public and private beneﬁts. Basic pensions
are generally co-managed by the state and social partners, while complementary pensions
(retraites comple´mentaires) are organised on a professional basis and managed by social
partners. Under occupational pensions, there are a number of mandatory schemes
deﬁned as ‘complementary’, such as the Association for Complementary Persion Schemes
(ARRCO)2 and the General Association for Executive Pension Institutions (AGIRC)3 for
private sector workers and IRCANTEC,4 a scheme for non-tenured state workers. The
concept of early retirement does not have a clear meaning in France; here the age of
eligibility to pension entitlements (60 in the private sector) is often considered the normal
retirement age.
In Austria, public pre-retirement beneﬁts have not been included in the sample, while
public invalidity or incapacity pensions are composed of a re-distributive element, a
ﬁnancial aid paid to people who cannot support themselves, for example due to disability
(Staatliche Sozialhilfe). In Denmark, all survivor pensions from spouse or partner have
been classiﬁed as private. In the Netherlands, the war pension category was not included.
Everyone above the age of 65 is entitled to public old age pension (AOW), while pre-
retirement public pension (usually provided to those aged between 62 and 65) is very
rare and only provided to individuals who are not in receipt of any other income. Also,
the public invalidity or incapacity pension category here takes the form of public income
support (ABW, IOAW/IOAZ, Aanvullende). In Sweden, occupational pensions for blue-
collar workers in the private sector (SAF-LO), for white-collar workers in the private sector
(ITP), for government workers (PAF) and formunicipal and local government workers (KPA)
are all deﬁned as private pensions.
Table 1 shows public and private pension coverage, together with the indicative
pension system adopted in each country. In Beveridgean countries, private pensions play
an evident greater role. In Denmark, the Netherlands and in the UK, private pension
coverage is far higher than in the other countries (about a third of the retired population
receive a private pension in Denmark and over half in the Netherlands and in the UK). The
importance of private income components in these countries is the result of long-standing
policies encouraging private responsibility for ﬁnancial well-being in retirement.
The case of France is interesting. It shows high private pension coverage (over 52 per
cent) but its welfare system is more in line with the Bismarckian tradition. The high private
pension coverage here can be attributed to the way in which some ‘complementary’
mandatory occupational schemes have been classiﬁed as private pensions. In France, the
private sector pension system is a two-tiered structure with mandatory occupational
schemes that complement the basic insurance pension, which means occupational
pension plans arewell established amongst private sector employees (Srinivas et al., 2000).
These ‘retraites comple´mentaires’ are prevalent in private sectors, such as manufacturing,
commerce, services and agriculture (ARRCO and AGIRC), but also include a compulsory
scheme amongst non-tenured state workers (IRCANTEC).
Similarly, in Sweden, where private pension coverage is just below 26 per cent,
occupational schemes, such as those for workers in the private sector (SAF-LO and ITP)
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in receipt of both
public and private
pensions
Austria Bismarckian 96.66 6.27 4.07
Germany Bismarckian 94.88 20.32 19.10
Sweden Encompassing 84.44 25.76 9.99
Netherlands Beveridgean 85.11 54.22 39.58
Spain Bismarckian 98.30 1.80 0.38
Italy Bismarckian 94.97 6.00 1.56
France Bismarckian 97.16 52.12 49.41
Denmark Beveridgean 95.92 30.09 26.60
Greece Bismarckian 99.17 1.35 0.54
Belgium Bismarckian 95.21 7.62 3.36
UK Beveridgean 97.28 55.38 46.38
Sources: SHARE, Wave 1 and ELSA, Wave 2, (2004−2005).
and those for public sector employees (PAF and KPA), are very widespread (reaching
90 per cent of the workforce in some sectors). These schemes are not mandatory as
they are negotiated by nation-wide collective agreements between employers and trade
unions. Amongst the other countries that have adopted a Bismarckian model, there is
evidence of much lower private pension coverage.
Germany has a private pension coverage of 20 per cent, which is higher than most
other countries of Bismarckian tradition. Here occupational pension schemes are more
extensive than in other parts of Europe; however, pension coverage differs remarkably
according to ﬁrm size and is particularly low amongst small companies. More recently,
the ‘Riester Reform’ has been introduced to boost occupational and individual private
pensions through tax incentives for future retirees. In Austria, Italy and Belgium, the
proportion of pensioners receiving a private pension ranges between 6 and 7 per cent.
Private pensions here are mainly private insurance policies, while occupational schemes
have been fully implemented only very recently. Although a number of pension reforms
have occurred in these countries in the last 20 years with the aim of promoting funded
occupational schemes, their enactment has not taken place until far more recently (in the
last ﬁve years) and therefore they do not affect current retirees. In Spain and Greece,
the ﬁgures are particularly low (less than 2 per cent in both countries), suggesting that the
vast majority of those in retirement rely almost entirely on their state pensions.
The results are somewhat unexpected when we consider the proportions of those
who are in receipt of both private and public pensions. The Bismarckian countries
here show strong dissimilarities. In France and Germany, the vast majority of those who
receive a private pension are also in receipt of a state pension. This seems to conﬁrm
that in these two countries, but particularly in France, occupational schemes are not
only widespread but also used extensively to complement state pensions. In Austria and
Belgium, the percentages of those who receive both pensions become very low, suggesting
that private pensions, mainly in the form of insurance policies here, are used rarely to
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Austria 1,310 623 1,550 1,000
Germany 1,482 436 1,540 926
Sweden 1,298 240 1,661 1,416
Netherlands 1,000 900 2,680 2,320
Spain∗ NA NA NA 490
Italy∗ NA NA NA 650
France 950 723 1,650 1,456
Denmark 886 641 1,810 1,479
Greece∗ NA NA NA 550
Belgium 1,000 500 1,462 967
UK 970 776 1,720 1,287
Notes: ∗The data for these countries are not sufﬁcient.
∗∗This includes all individuals in the sample, those receiving both private and
public beneﬁts and those only receiving public or private pensions.
Sources: SHARE, Wave 1 and ELSA, Wave 2, (2004−05).
boost state pensions. This is even more so in Italy, Spain and Greece where percentages
of those in receipt of both pensions are less than 1.6 per cent.
Sweden also shows an unexpected result as the proportion of pensioners receiving
private and public beneﬁts drops to less than 10 per cent, meaning that over half of those
who receive a private pension do not receive any state beneﬁts. A possible explanation
may be that private beneﬁts here are used primarily by those who take early retirement. All
major occupational schemes in Sweden (such as SAF-LO and ITP) allow for a contractual
early retirement plan starting from the age of 55. Findings for the Beveridgean countries
are less surprising. Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK show high percentages of
those in receipt of both pensions, as we would expect, due to the established role of
private/occupational pensions used to complement basic state pensions.
Exten t o f p r i va te pens ions and adequacy o f pens ion income
In this section, we present our ﬁndings on the extent and role of private pensions in
the countries examined. Table 2 shows the monthly amounts (median values) of private
and public pensions as well as the overall pension incomes for those who receive both
pensions and for the sample as a whole (including those who only receive one type of
pension). The choice of using median values over averages was made on the basis that
median income gives a better overall indication of ﬁnancial wellness, as average incomes
are heavily affected by outliers in the distributions.
Our results indicate that in all countries examined private pensions help boost overall
retirement, which implies that they are being used to complement public beneﬁts rather
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than substituting them. This is not only the case in Beveridgean countries but also in
countries of Bismarckian tradition, such as Germany, France, Austria and Belgium (the
amounts of overall income for those in receipt of private and public pensions are higher
than the overall income for the whole sample). We are not considering the effect of private
beneﬁts on overall pension income in Italy, Spain and Greece due to the extremely low
private pension coverage in these countries, which makes it impossible to draw any
meaningful conclusions.
An interesting ﬁnding is that in Austria, Germany, Belgium and Sweden those in
receipt of private pensions are also those with high state pensions. This result seems
to contradict the crowding out effect, at least in these countries. Another important
outcome of our analysis is the similarity between levels of private and public beneﬁts
in countries where private schemes are more extensive. This is certainly the case for
countries of Beveridgean tradition, but also for France. Long-standing pension policies in
these countries have favoured contributions to private/occupational schemes that, having
matured over the working life, result in higher private beneﬁts. Long-term contributions
together with greater occupational pension coverage lead to higher levels of overall
incomes for a large section of the retired population (the Netherlands, Denmark and
France feature the highest income levels).
In the remainder of this section, we show our ﬁndings in terms of income adequacy. To
deﬁne income adequacy we introduce the concept of ‘at-risk-of-poverty rate’ as identiﬁed
by the European Commission’s Eurostat. We measure the rate of those at risk of poverty by
calculating the share of pensioners with a disposable income5 below the poverty threshold
(see Engen et al., 2005), which we identify as 60 per cent of the median disposable income
in agreement with the Eurostat guidelines (Eurostat, 1998, 2005, 2010) as well as Duncan
et al. (1993) and Whelan et al. (2003). The equivalised disposable income after taxes and
social transfers is expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS) to take into account
differences in the cost of living across countries.
Figure 1 shows the ‘at-risk-of-poverty rates’ for each country together with the Gini
coefﬁcients representing income inequality.
Poverty rates amongst pensioners are lowest in Sweden, Denmark, France and
the Netherlands (between less than 10 per cent in Denmark and 15 per cent in the
Netherlands) where private pension coverage reaches greater portions of the retired
population. This indicates that a combination of nation-wide agreements promoting
privately managed pensions as well as adequate state pensions is proving effective to
keep people out of poverty. Amongst Bismarckian countries, Austria and Belgium show
relatively low at-risk-of-poverty rates (below 22 per cent), which can be explained by the
generous state pensions in place. High rates of poverty are associated with the almost
complete absence of private beneﬁts and total reliance on low state pension, as in the
case of Spain, Italy and Greece where a third or more of the retired population receives a
pension income below their national poverty lines. Our ﬁndings show that where private
pensions are used extensively, over a long period and in combination with public beneﬁts
there is a signiﬁcant positive effect on retirement income.
Income inequality amid pensioners is high in all countries examined, and there is
no clear evidence of a link between different welfare systems and levels of dispersion in
retirement incomes. Although some Bismarckian countries, such as Spain, Greece and
Belgium display the highest levels of income inequality, in Germany and Italy we also
ﬁnd the lowest variability of retirement income followed by the Netherlands and the UK.
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Figure 1. Poverty and inequality rates, 2004−2005
Sources: SHARE, Wave 1 and ELSA, Wave 2, (2004–2005) and Eurostat (2005).
Conc lus ions
We examined public and private pensions as well as the adequacy of retirement income
in Europe. We used the SHARE and ELSA databases for our analysis and classiﬁed the
countries according to their pension systems.
We built on previous research (Pedersen, 2004; Disney, 2000) and found that,
although private pensions are well established in countries of Beveridgean tradition
(namely the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark), France and Sweden also present
high private schemes coverage. France is closer to the Bismarckian pension system,
however policies have been implemented to render membership to occupational schemes
mandatory or prevalent. The extent of private pension coverage together with long-term
contributions have the positive effect of increasing overall pension incomes for vast
portions of the population as well as reducing the rate of those at risk of poverty in
retirement.
In contrast, in some Bismarckian countries (Germany, Austria and Belgium) the
proportions of pensioners drawing their retirement income from private sources are
considerably lower. In these countries, those receiving private pensions are more likely to
be also in receipt of high state beneﬁts, which suggests a lack of support for the crowding
out effect between private and public beneﬁts. In Italy, Spain and Greece, the numbers of
those receiving private pensions are negligible and therefore we can only conclude that
in these countries private components do not contribute to overall retirement income in
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any signiﬁcant way. Those in retirement here rely almost entirely on state pensions and
this may account for the high rates of those at-risk-of-poverty.
Our ﬁndings indicate that where there is a high coverage of private pensions and
where these are well established in terms of entitlements the resulting effect on total
retirement income is positive with values largely above the poverty thresholds. We
also showed that some countries exhibit high levels of private/occupational schemes
in combination with relatively high state pensions. This seems to be a predominant
feature where variants of the Beveridgean model have been applied (the Netherlands,
Denmark and to a lower extent the UK, but also in France and Sweden) and suggests
that no crowding out effect is taking place between public and private beneﬁts. A similar
conclusion on the lack of a substitution/crowding out effect can be drawn when we
consider that private pensions have not developed, until now, in countries that present
generally low levels of state pensions, such as Spain, Italy and Greece.
Notes
1 SHARE also includes Switzerland however we excluded it not being part of the European Union.
2 Association pour le re´gime de retraite comple´mentaire des salarie´s.
3 Association ge´ne´rale des institutions de retraite comple´mentaire des cadres.
4 Institution de retraite comple´mentaire des agents non titulaires de l’ Etat et des collectivite´s
publiques.
5 This is income before taxes and social transfers.
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